I. INTRODUCTION
O ne of the largest deductions taken against individual income taxes is the deduction for state and local income and property taxes. Taking all state and local tax deductions as a group, the deduction is the third largest tax expenditure following the exclusion of employer contributions for health insurance from income and the deduction for mortgage interest on owner occupied homes (Offi ce of Management and Budget, 2010) . This deduction has come under attack at various times despite its widespread popularity. The most serious threat came in the debates that led to the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA86). While the elimination of the entire deduction for state and local taxes was proposed initially, TRA86 only removed the deduction for general sales taxes. And this curtailment was undone to some extent in the American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 when individuals were given the option to deduct either income or sales taxes (but not both). 1 The deduction was attacked again by President George W. Bush's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform and more recently by the National Commission on Fiscal Gilbert E. Metcalf: Department of Economics, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA (gmetcalf@tufts.edu) Responsibility and Reform (2010) . President Bush's panel argued in language that could have come from either report that ending this deduction would contribute to a "cleaner and broader tax base" and a tax system that was more equitable across income groups (President's Advisory Panel on Federal Tax Reform, 2005, p. 83) .
While these recommendations remain to be taken up by Congress, the deduction for state and local taxes has been eroded to some extent by two features of the federal tax code. First, limitations on itemized deductions reduce the value of this deduction for some households with large amounts of itemized deductions. Second, the Alternative Minimum Tax (AMT) targets this deduction directly. In fact, a major determinant of whether a taxpayer is subject to the AMT is the presence of large deductions for state and local taxes. A taxpayer subject to the AMT loses this deduction.
The magnitude of the tax expenditure for state and local tax deductions makes it a prime target for policy makers looking for revenue to pay for other changes in the tax code.
2 Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) , however, argued that estimates of the revenue gain from eliminating deductibility may be too high as they do not take into account a possible shift away from once-deductible taxes to non-deductible taxes and fees in the absence of deductibility. Many of these latter taxes and fees are paid by businesses. As these costs rise, federal business tax collections would fall, offsetting some of the gains of ending deductibility. Feldstein and Metcalf also found little evidence that ending deductibility would have a negative impact on state and local spending itself.
Given the renewed interest in changing or eliminating this subsidy, I present a number of distributional analyses -considering both variation across income and across states -of the subsidy from deductibility. These distributional analyses are static in nature. The Feldstein and Metcalf analysis suggests that the mix of state and local taxes, as well as overall state and local spending, could change in response to changes in the deduction. To consider this issue, I re-estimate the Feldstein-Metcalf regressions using a large panel of data on state and local governments. I fi nd that the use of deductible state and local taxes is sensitive to federal deductibility. Unlike the previous analysis, I also fi nd that overall sub-national spending could fall in the absence of deductibility.
Focusing on the distributional impact of the federal deduction for state and local taxes in isolation may not provide a complete picture of the distributional impact of ending deductibility. To the extent that state and local spending is directed towards services disproportionately utilized by lower income households, the regressivity of the deduction may be overstated. Whether that is true or not is beyond the scope of this paper.
The next section provides a brief review of the empirical literature on the impact of federal deductibility of state and local taxes on sub-federal fi scal systems. Section III provides static estimates of the revenue loss from deductibility from the National Bureau of Economic Research's TAXSIM tax simulator. Section IV constructs distributional tables for the deduction, again using TAXSIM data. Section V presents estimates of the effects of eliminating deductibility on the state and local tax mix and the overall level of state and local spending, using a state-level panel data model of state and local taxes, fees, and spending. A brief fi nal section summarizes and concludes the paper.
II. BACKGROUND
The deduction for state and local taxes is a signifi cant form of federal aid to state and local governments. In the fi scal year 2011 budget submission, the deductions for all non-business state and local taxes amount to over $70 billion, making it the third largest tax expenditure in the federal budget (Offi ce of Management and Budget, 2010) . While state and local tax deductibility dates to the creation of the modern income tax, it became a major focus of research activity in the mid-1980s when President Ronald Reagan proposed to eliminate the deduction as part of the tax reform proposal issued in late 1984 (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 1984) . The fi nal legislation, TRA86, ultimately eliminated only the deduction for general sales taxes. Many felt that this was not especially controversial as most taxpayers used sales tax look-up tables which, from an individual taxpayer's point of view, did not necessarily appear related to their own spending.
Early research on this topic focused on the role that deductibility played in encouraging state and local spending. After all, one of the rationales for the deduction is to support spending at the sub-national level that might have signifi cant spillover effects into other jurisdictions. Spending on public parks, for example, by one community might benefi t members of other communities who could enjoy the park. In other words, state and local spending could have important positive externalities or be public goods. In the absence of federal intervention, it was argued that state and local governments were unlikely to provide the optimal amount of these goods and services.
3 Early papers in this literature include Zimmerman (1983, 1984) , and Ladd (1984) . Attention was increasingly paid to the mix of taxes chosen as well as the level of spending. Zimmerman (1983) provided a median voter analysis of the relationship of income tax reliance on deductibility while Hettich and Winer (1984) provided a political economy analysis. Neither paper was successful at fi nding an economically sensible relationship between deductibility and tax reliance. Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) employed an average voter framework to analyze the impact of deductibility on state and local spending and tax reliance. Their innovation was to use the IRS Public Use Files with the NBER's tax calculator, TAXSIM, to estimate average marginal tax prices for state and local deductible taxes. Based on a cross-section of states in fi scal year 1980, they found statistical support for the view that deductibility led to greater reliance on state and local taxes that are deductible at the federal level. The statistical results were less clear cut as to whether deductibility increased state and local spending out of own-source revenues or whether sub-federal governments were substituting deductible for non-deductible taxes and fees while holding spending constant. The authors discussed the implications of both possibilities and noted that " [u] ntil additional evidence is available, it seems best to recognize that both responses are plausible and consistent with the existing data" (Feldstein and Metcalf, 1987, p. 726) .
Subsequent work corroborated Feldstein and Metcalf's fi nding that federal deductibility is associated with greater reliance on those state and local taxes that are deductible at the federal level. That subsequent work was less clear-cut on whether deductibility simply leads to a shift in revenue structure or whether it leads to increased state and local spending. 4 Based on an analysis of 172 municipalities over a three-year period, Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1988) fi nd that local spending is quite responsive to federal deductibility. Gade and Adkins (1990) also fi nd support for tax shifting and argue that most states would decrease overall spending if deductibility were ended. The precision of their estimates on state spending cannot be determined since they did not run regressions of spending on a tax price variable but rather inferred the impact from the underlying tax instrument regressions. Metcalf (1993) looked in greater detail at the composition of state-level taxes over an eight-year period and found support for the view that deductibility leads to a substitution of personal income for corporate income taxes. While he did not explicitly test for impacts on state spending, the estimates suggest that deductibility enhances state spending as well as shifting the mix of revenue instruments.
This paper returns to the basic formulation in Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) but employs a panel data set of state and local government tax and spending structure rather than a single cross section. The small number of observations in their 1987 study limited Feldstein and Metcalf's ability to obtain statistically precise estimates and disentangle the two possible impacts of federal deductibility on state and local fi scal structuresrevenue shifting and/or more state and local spending.
III. MEASURING THE REVENUE LOSS FROM STATE AND LOCAL TAX DEDUCTIBILITY
Before considering any behavioral responses that might arise from ending deductibility, I provide some statistics on measurements of the tax expenditure for deductibility that ignore behavioral responses. I fi rst focus on errors that arise from adding tax expenditure estimates. In general, users are cautioned not to add tax expenditure estimates, given interactions within the tax code as deductions and other tax expenditure items are changed. Both the Offi ce of Management and Budget and the Joint Committee on Taxation report tax expenditure estimates for state and local tax deductibility separately. Proposals to end deductibility, on the other hand, typically eliminate both sets of deductions. If one wants to know the impact of ending all state and local tax deductions, how large an error occurs when simply adding the two tax expenditure estimates? 4 Feldstein and Metcalf's results suggested that states would shift away from their reliance on general sales taxes after 1986. This appeared not to happen. A number of papers addressed this issue including Inman (1989) , Courant and Gramlich (1990) , Metcalf (1992) , and Metcalf (1993) . More recent work by Izraeli and Kellman (2003) suggests that reliance on the general sales tax did eventually fall once suffi cient time had passed.
Tax code interactions can lead to biases in either direction from simply adding the two tax expenditure estimates to measure the impact of ending all state and local tax deductions. For example, one might expect that eliminating the deduction for all state and local personal taxes would yield a smaller tax expenditure estimate than the sum of the tax expenditures for personal non-property taxes and property taxes, since removing one of the deductions will push some taxpayers below the threshold for itemizing deductions at which point their other state and local tax deduction becomes worthless. On the other hand, removing one tax deduction could push taxpayers into higher tax brackets thereby making the other deduction more valuable. Thus whether summing individual tax expenditures overestimates or underestimates the tax expenditure estimate from removing both deductions is a priori uncertain.
The fi rst row of Table 1 shows results from using TAXSIM to estimate the state and local tax deduction tax expenditures for calendar year 2004 using the Statistics of Income (SOI) public use fi le assuming elimination of the deduction under current law. This is the difference in tax liability for an individual return (as calculated by TAXSIM) between the current law and the law assuming the elimination of the deduction. This difference is computed at the individual level and then aggregated using the sample weights from the SOI dataset. The weighted sum of the individual estimates gives the estimate of the tax expenditure indicated in each column. For example, under current law (as of 2004), eliminating the deduction for personal, non-property taxes yields a tax expenditure estimate of $40.3 billion. The corresponding estimate for property taxes is $22.0 billion. Adding these two numbers yields an estimate of the impact of ending all state and local deductibility of $62.3 billion. This is 0.3 percent less than the estimate generated in TAXSIM by eliminating all state and local deductions ($62.5 billion). This calculation suggests that adding the two estimates does not seriously misrepresent the estimate of the tax expenditure from ending both deductions simultaneously when calculated using 2004 data.
5 But the error varies over time. Figure 1 shows that the error peaks at 5 percent in 1993 and has been steadily falling since.
I also consider the errors in adding the tax expenditure estimates under different assumptions about the tax law. In the second row of Table 1 , I assume that no AMT patch is applied in 2004. Now adding the estimates underestimates the aggregate tax expenditure estimate by 8 percent. The error is smaller if the AMT is eliminated altogether or if the Bush tax cuts had not been in effect. In either case the error is less than 5 percent. In short, it does not appear that large errors occur when adding tax expenditure estimates for the two state and local tax deductions to get an estimate of the tax expenditure arising from eliminating all state and local tax deductions altogether.
Table 1 also indicates that the AMT signifi cantly reduces the value of this deduction. If there were no AMT, the tax expenditure estimate would be 15 percent higher ($72.0 billion versus $62.5 billion). Conversely, eliminating the AMT patch -which reduces the impact of the AMT -would lower the tax expenditure estimate by 20 percent ($52.6 billion versus $62.5 billion). Table 1 also shows that the Bush tax cuts reduced the tax expenditure on deductibility by 20 percent ($78.9 billion versus $62.5 billion). Lower tax rates reduce the value of all deductions. 0% 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Year Percentage
IV. DISTRIBUTIONAL ANALYSIS
How are the benefi ts of deductibility distributed across taxpayer groups? In this section, I report both income and geographic measures of the benefi ts of the deduction. For the income analysis, I use cash income to sort taxpayers. Cash income equals adjusted gross income (AGI) less state and local tax refunds plus adjustments to income, medical savings account (MSA) and Keogh plan deductions, tax-exempt interest and non-taxable Social Security benefi ts. The distributional impact is measured by taking weighted averages across the 150,000 returns in the 2004 SOI Public Use File at different income deciles.
6 Table 2 presents the change in average tax liability for different income groups if deductibility were eliminated. The increase in average tax liability is below $100 for the bottom 60 percent of the income distribution. The tenth decile faces an average increase of $3,238. Considerable skewness occurs in this top decile as the mean tax increase exceeds the increase in tax liability for the 75 th percentile within this decile. Breaking down the top decile a bit further, the largest increases occur in the top 1 percent of the distribution. As a percentage of cash income, the increase in tax liability is quite small -less than 1 percent for the bottom 90 percent of the income distribution. Eliminating this deduction does add progressivity to the federal tax system, as tax liability as a percentage of cash income rises monotonically with income. The last column of Table  2 shows that the share of returns facing higher taxes goes up steadily with income.
As an alternative to eliminating deductibility altogether, I consider two alternative reforms. The fi rst replaces the deduction with a 15 percent non-refundable tax credit. In effect this allows all taxpayers to deduct their state and local taxes as if they were in the 15 percent tax bracket. 7 The second reform allows a deduction above a fl oor. If policymakers believe that the tax deduction has positive incentive effects, the fl oor lowers the cost of providing the deduction while continuing to provide an incentive for state and local spending. I assume a fl oor set at $7,575. This generates a tax expenditure of $35 billion in 2004. Replacing the deduction with a 15 percent tax credit raises $14 billion in 2004, considerably less than eliminating the deduction, in part because taxpayers who were not receiving the benefi t of the deduction because they took the standard deduction now have the opportunity to take the credit. Table 3 provides distributional results for shifting from the current deduction to the 15 percent credit. Because this reform now makes the benefi t available to all taxpayers, it lowers tax liability for some households although the reductions are quite modest (Table  3) . Fewer taxpayers face higher tax bills than if deductibility is eliminated altogether, and the average change in tax liability is less than one-half of 1 percent of cash income. Compared to eliminating deductibility, this reform is less progressive at the federal level.
Allowing a deduction above a fl oor is analyzed in Table 4 . The fl oor reform is less progressive than either of the other two reforms. It raises revenue, however, while preserving the strongest marginal incentive for state and local tax collections. In Table 6 , I consider eliminating all deductions for state and local taxes, assuming no AMT patch, no AMT, and no Bush tax cuts, all in 2004. I focus on the AMT because of its increased impact on middle class households in the tax code. The Bush tax cuts Tax 
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Impact of Tax are also germane, given the recent decision to extend the Bush tax cuts for another two years (2010) (2011) (2012) . The pattern of increased taxes from eliminating the deduction is not surprising, given the aggregate estimate of the tax expenditure in Table 1 . Nevertheless, a few interesting facts emerge. First, the AMT patch in 2004 increases the regressivity of the deduction with most of the impact occurring in the top decile. This point is reinforced by a comparison of the Current distribution with the No AMT distribution. In the absence of the AMT, the state and local tax deduction is more regressive, again with nearly all the increased regressivity occurring in the top 5 percent of the income distribution. Second, the Bush tax cuts also served to reduce the regressivity of this deduction. Unlike in the AMT case, the change in tax burden is spread over more deciles.
These distributional results hold behavior constant. I next turn to a reconsideration of the behavioral impacts of ending deductibility of state and local taxes. While the results from this analysis cannot be used to compute new distributional tables, they are informative regarding the revenue and distributional impact of ending or otherwise modifying deductibility.
V. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE BEHAVIORAL RESPONSE TO THE DEDUCTION
State and local governments choose their mix of revenue instruments as well as their levels of spending knowing that taxpayers in their state may be able to deduct some of these taxes on their federal returns. This exporting of state and local taxes to the federal government lowers the political cost of raising revenue at the sub-federal level. How do state and local governments respond to this feature of the federal tax code? I measure this response by following the empirical strategy of Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) and estimating regressions of state and local deductible taxes, non-deductible taxes, and own-source revenue to determine the impact of federal deductibility. In contrast to this previous analysis, which focused on a cross section from fi scal year 1980, I employ panel data from 1979 through 2001.
8 Where calendar year data are matched with fi scal year data, the calendar year data for the beginning of the fi scal year are used. Thus for state and local data for fi scal year 1998, calendar year data from 1997 are used. This refl ects the fact that decisions about fi scal structure are set at the beginning of the fi scal year, which occurs in the previous calendar year.
The key tax variable is the tax price for state and local tax deductions. This is the reduction in federal and state taxes arising from an additional dollar of tax deduction. As a simple example of the concept, consider a taxpayer whose federal tax bracket is 25 percent. Further assume that federal taxes are not deductible at the state level. In that case, an additional $100 of state tax deductions will reduce federal tax liability by $25. The net cost of raising this $100 of state taxes is only $75 as $25 has been exported to the federal government through deductibility. If m k is the k th taxpayer's federal marginal tax bracket, then this taxpayer's tax price (P k ) for state and local deductible taxes is
This assumes that the taxpayer itemizes her deductions. The tax price for a non-itemizer is one. Let d k be a dummy variable equal to one if taxpayer k is an itemizer and zero otherwise. Then this taxpayer's tax price is
If federal taxes can be deducted at the state level, then the formula for taxpayer k's tax price is slightly more complicated,
but the NBER's TAXSIM calculator can compute these tax prices easily. TAXSIM is a computer tax model of the federal and state tax codes covering from 1977-2006. 9 Finally, I can construct state-level average tax prices as the weighted average of tax prices for taxpayers in state i using the TAXSIM data weights on taxpayers from the IRS SOI database used by the tax calculator,
where ω kt is the data weight on the k th taxpayer in year t and S it is the set of taxpayers in state i in year t.
I estimate regressions of the form
where i indexes states and t indexes years. The dependent variable is deductible state and local taxes, non-deductible state and local taxes and fees, or own-source revenue relative to personal income. 10 The row vector, X it , contains variables that help explain the dependent variable. These must vary within states over time given the inclusion of state-specifi c fi xed effects and year dummies. State-specifi c fi xed effects are included 9 Feenberg and Coutts (1993) provide a description of TAXSIM. The calculation in (3) is not exactly correct as it does not account for the phase out of itemized deductions that began in 2000 or the AMT. TAXSIM takes these provisions of the tax code into account when computing tax prices. 10 General sales taxes are included under deductible taxes in those years when they are deductible on the federal tax return and included under non-deductible taxes and fees in all other years.
to control for unobserved attributes of a state that affect fi scal structure and are likely correlated with explanatory variables. 11 Year dummies provide a fl exible framework for controlling for aggregate shocks to state and local tax systems and spending.
As pointed out by Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) , OLS regressions of (5) are likely to provide biased estimates of the coeffi cient on the tax price variable. This is most easily seen by considering (2). Consider a shock that increases state income tax collections. This increases the deduction available to the taxpayer with two opposing effects. The fi rst is that an increase in the potential state tax deduction increases the likelihood that a taxpayer will itemize on her federal tax return. This induces a negative correlation between the error term (ε it ) and the tax price P it and biases the OLS estimate of β 1 downward. The second effect is that an increase in deductions could push the taxpayer into a lower tax bracket lowering m it . This induces a positive correlation between the error term and the tax price and biases the OLS estimate of β 1 upward. Which effect dominates is an empirical question.
To control for endogeneity, I construct three instruments. The fi rst is a synthetic instrument that attributes to each household the national probability of itemizing based on number of dependents (0, 1, 2+) and AGI group. I divide households into one of eight equally sized AGI groups. 12 The instrument for taxpayer k in year t is
is the probability of itemizing in the national sample in year t for households with j dependents in AGI class l. The instrument used in the regression is the weighted average across taxpayers in a state in a given year following the approach in (4).
The second instrument is constructed by setting the k th taxpayer's state and local tax deductions to zero and computing the change in tax liability resulting from a marginal increase in wage income. Call this marginal tax rate m kt 0 . The fi rst dollar tax price for taxpayer k in year t equals dˆ, and the fi rst dollar tax price instrument is the weighted average of P kt 0 across taxpayers in a state in a given year following the approach in (4).
The third instrument is constructed by replacing the taxpayer's state and local tax deductions with national averages based on number of dependents and AGI class and then computing the change in tax liability resulting from a marginal increase in wage income. Call this marginal tax rate for taxpayer k in year t m kt L . The last dollar tax price for the taxpayer equals
Holtz-Eakin (1986) assesses the biases arising from not controlling for fi xed effects in state and local government fi scal structure regressions. 12 The cut points for the AGI groups vary across years to maintain equal-sized groups. and the last dollar tax price instrument is the weighted average of P kt L across taxpayers in a state in a given year following the approach in (4). Table 7 shows summary statistics for the variables used in the regressions. Deductible taxes average 5.8 percent of personal income, ranging from 1.9 to 11.8 percent. Nondeductible taxes and fees average 8.9 percent of personal income and show a wider range across states and time. Own-source revenue is the sum of these two variables, averaging 14.7 percent of personal income. In addition to the tax price variable, I include demographic data on percentage young (age 17 and under) and old (age 65 and older). These two demographic groups are important drivers of demands for state and local public services, especially at the local level. 13 The change in the unemployment rate is included to control for state-specifi c economic shocks not captured by state or year effects. The next set of variables captures features of the distribution of income in the state that could affect the demand for revenue as well as the tax mix. They also control for non-linear income effects for which the tax price variable might otherwise serve as a proxy. Finally, I include information about the share of households married in the state. Table 8 presents regression results for personal deductible taxes. Column 1 presents an OLS regression of non-business deductible taxes on the tax price variable and other control variables. Before discussing the tax price coeffi cient, consider some of the other variables. The coeffi cients on the AGI range variables are positive with the coeffi cients on the $25,000 to $50,000 AGI dummy variable (fr25) and the $100,000 and over AGI dummy variable (fr100) statistically signifi cant. As might be expected, the coeffi cient on fr100 is substantially larger than the coeffi cient on fr25 or the $50,000 to $100,000 AGI dummy variable (fr50). This pattern holds in general for the other regressions on nonbusiness deductible taxes. The AGI variance and skew variables are never statistically signifi cant in these regressions indicating that, controlling for the shares of returns in various AGI groups, other distribution statistics do not affect the choice of these taxes. The form of income also has little impact on the level of this tax. The coeffi cient on the capital gains income share in AGI (capagi) is statistically signifi cant in all regressions though the estimated elasticity (not reported) is quite small.
States with a large share of young children or elderly people tend to have lower reliance on taxes deductible against personal income, though only the coeffi cient on the share of young children is statistically signifi cant. The coeffi cient on the elderly share likely refl ects a demand for lower overall spending by the elderly. The coeffi cient on the child share is a bit puzzling since this should correlate with a demand for school spending. Contrary to the fi nding in Metcalf (1993) , increases in the unemployment rate are associated with a greater reliance on taxes deductible against personal income.
The coeffi cient on the tax price variable equals -2.41 and is precisely estimated. The elasticity at the mean equals -4.1, suggesting that the state tax structure is highly responsive to changes in the tax price. However, we must be cautious about this estimate given the potential endogeneity discussed above. The next regression in Table 8 presents Table 8 Deductible Taxes two stage least squares estimates of the coeffi cients, controlling for the endogeneity in the tax price variable with the instruments described above. The fi rst stage regression (not reported here) has a high R 2 with the F statistic on the joint signifi cance of the instruments highly signifi cant. In the second stage regression (column 2) the coefficient estimate on the tax price variable falls in absolute value from -2.41 to -1.93. The downward bias in the OLS estimate suggests that the itemization bias outweighs the tax bracket bias. While the coeffi cient is less precisely estimated, it is still statistically signifi cant at the 1 percent level. At the mean, the elasticity of the reliance on deductible taxes with respect to the tax price is -3.1.
One concern with the instruments used is that they may not adequately control for non-linear income effects and that the tax price variable may simply be picking up additional income effects. In the next column I increase the number of AGI share variables to provide greater fl exibility in disentangling income from tax price effects. The two-stage least squares estimate increases in absolute value to -2.28 and continues to be highly statistically signifi cant. The tax price elasticity at the mean from this regression equals -3.6. As in all the other two-stage least squares regressions, the fi rst stage regressions fi t quite well and provide no evidence of problems arising from weak instruments. It does not appear that the tax price variable is simply measuring non-linear income effects.
A second concern with the empirical specifi cation is that the composition of population in the state is endogenous and could affect the taste for deductible taxes. In particular, if households in high tax brackets are attracted to states that rely heavily on deductible taxes, OLS  IV  IV  IV  IV the coeffi cient estimates will be biased. State fi xed effects should control for much of this endogeneity. However it may be that states are increasing their reliance on deductible taxes and thereby increasingly attracting taxpayers in high tax brackets. To control for this possibility, I create new instruments for each state in each year in which I calculate the average marginal tax price by running all the households in the SOI dataset through TAXSIM assuming they are subject to a particular state's tax code. Variation in these instruments is entirely driven by differences in state tax codes. The last two columns of the table report results from these regressions. I have replaced the original instruments with these new instruments. The fourth column reports results with the more complete set of AGI distribution variables and is otherwise comparable to the results in column 3. The estimated coeffi cient on the tax price variable is considerably higher in absolute value and continues to be precisely estimated despite its higher standard error. The increase in magnitude of the estimated tax price coeffi cient is not consistent with high bracket households sorting into states that depend heavily on deductible taxes. If this were the case, then the estimated coeffi cient on the tax price variable should be getting smaller in absolute value. The impact of the new set of instruments is not affected by dropping demographic information on households in the sample (column 5). Thus I conclude that the negative sign on the tax price variable is not being driven by household sorting in the sample. If anything, sorting may be biasing the estimated coeffi cient toward zero.
If changes in the tax mix occur in response to changes in the deductibility of state and local taxes, then we should see an increase in the use of non-deductible taxes and fees in response to an increase in the tax price for state and local taxes. I explore this in regressions reported in Table 9 . The format of the table is the same as Table 8 . The results suggest that we are not observing a shift from deductible to non-deductible taxes and fees. The coeffi cient estimates in this table are substantially smaller in magnitude than the estimates from the previous table and are never precisely estimated in the instrumental variable (IV) regressions. In fact, the sign is counterintuitive if tax shifting is occurring. The impact of deductibility on own-source revenue is shown in Table 10 , which reports a sharp drop in own-source revenue as the tax price rises. The IV estimate with the original instruments is -2.62 and is precisely estimated. The elasticity at the mean of the sample equals -1.64.
Recall that Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) could not distinguish between the hypothesis that deductibility only affects the mix of revenue sources while having no impact on overall own-source revenue and the hypothesis that own-source revenue increases with deductibility. The larger data set is helpful for obtaining greater statistical precision. The estimates reported in columns 4 or 5 of Tables 8-10 suggest the following. First, the impact of changes in the tax price on deductible tax shares is precisely estimated and similar in magnitude to estimates in the Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) paper (Table  8) .
14 Federal deductibility continues to have a signifi cant and large effect on the use of deductible taxes at the state and local level. Second, the coeffi cient on the tax price variable continues to be imprecisely estimated (Table 9 ) as in the 1987 analysis. Unlike in that earlier paper, the point estimates from the IV regressions are consistently negative though roughly one-half to one-third of the magnitude of the estimates in the 1987 study. As a result (the third point), the coeffi cient on the tax price variable is negative and statistically signifi cant in the own-source revenue regressions (Table 10 ). The IV estimates in columns 4 and 5 are roughly the same magnitude (after adjusting for differences in how the data are scaled) as in the full IV ratio regression reported in Table  1 of Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) . The results for own-source spending obtained in this analysis, which are based on a larger data set but otherwise similar methodology to the 1987 study, are consistent with the fi ndings of Holtz-Eakin and Rosen (1988) as discussed above, as well as the rough estimates of Gade and Adkins (1990) . I fi nd similar results with regressions in log form (not reported here) or with different subsets of variables included or excluded.
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One concern with my instruments is that political shocks that affect state fi scal systems might also affect the federal tax code thereby invalidating my instruments. and federal level; shocks to state political structures are likely to be correlated with the state's Congressional composition. The qualitative results were unaffected by the inclusion of this variable, which did, however, reduce the number of observations by half since Congress is elected biennially thereby reducing the precision of the estimates. Another concern with the specifi cation is that recessions may have differential impacts across states to the extent that states differentially rely on taxes on capital gains. If so, simply including year effects may not suffi ce to control for macroeconomic shocks. To test this, I ran regressions interacting the capital gains share in AGI (capagi) with the year dummies. Again, this had no material impact on the tax price coeffi cient estimates.
Finally, I also ran regressions on the simple cross-section of data from fi scal year 1980 -the data used by Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) . The results were qualitatively similar to the results from the panel regressions, though the point estimates in the deductible tax regressions were somewhat higher. The tax price coeffi cient estimate in the non-deductible tax and fee regressions is imprecisely estimated but in the range of estimates reported in Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) . The main difference is in the own-source revenue regressions where two of the three IV regressions are statistically signifi cant and considerably larger in magnitude than in the previous analysis.
Differences in cross-section results are likely due to a combination of factors. Perhaps most important, Feldstein and Metcalf (1987) only measured the federal tax price, whereas subsequent work (including this analysis) takes into account the possibility in some states that federal taxes may be deducted at the state level (see (3) above). Also, minor changes in the TAXSIM calculator code over the past 20 or so years lead to modest changes in statewide average tax price calculations. In addition, the regressors are not precisely the same across the two studies. If nothing else, all this suggests the fragility of making too strong an inference from a cross section regression with only 20 or so degrees of freedom, a point stressed in the original Feldstein and Metcalf analysis. The analysis in this paper points to offsetting effects of deductibility on tax progressivity. On the one hand, the federal deduction disproportionately benefi ts high bracket taxpayers. On the other hand, deductibility appears to lead to a greater reliance on progressive income taxes at the state and local level as discussed by Chernick (2005) among others. 17 The static distributional analysis in section IV, however, suggests that we might be able to avoid this tension between a deduction that disproportionately benefi ts high income taxpayers at the federal level while providing support for progressive taxes at the sub-national level by replacing the deduction with a 15 percent tax credit. This equalizes the benefi ts across tax brackets and makes the benefi t available to non-itemizers.
VI. CONCLUSION
The deduction for state and local taxes has been a feature of the income tax since its inception. It is justifi ed by some proponents as an important subsidy for state and local spending on the grounds that it increases spending on public goods that would otherwise be underfunded. While I do not assess the argument that state and local government spending is on public goods and therefore likely to be underfunded, the empirical evidence in this study indicates that the tax deduction is associated with higher levels of own-source revenue. The mechanism for this increased reliance is through deductible taxes. This analysis suggests that deductibility leads to greater reliance on income and property taxes and has no appreciable impact on non-deductible taxes and fees. Static distributional analysis suggests that the tax deduction is quite regressive at the federal level. However the regression analysis suggests that the deduction supports progressive taxes at the sub-national level.
Finally, it is possible to preserve an incentive for state and local spending through alternatives to the deduction, alternatives that reduce regressivity at the federal level. In particular, I consider setting a fl oor on the deduction as well as a replacement of the deduction with a 15 percent tax credit. The fl oor reform is an intermediate option that raises about one-half the revenue that is raised by eliminating the deduction (ignoring behavioral offsets). Replacing the deduction with a 15 percent tax credit raises the least amount of revenue before behavioral responses, since some people who would be eligible for the credit currently take the standard deduction and thus do not benefi t from the deduction. But the credit is the least regressive of the approaches that provide support for state and local fi scal systems considered in this paper.
